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"[I]n the movies you can't have thieves as heroes."
-June Gudmunsdottir (Greta Scacchi) in The Player'
INTRODUCTION
It has long been an axiom of copyright law that copyright
does not protect ideas, but only the fixed expression of ideas.2 For
the entertainment industry, this means that a motion picture, not
the underlying idea for the movie, receives copyright protection.
In Hollywood, the entire entertainment industry depends upon
unprotectable ideas to create the finished product, which will
attract audiences into theaters or viewers to television sets. To
attract an audience (and thereby to make money), many other
projects will frequently use the idea underlying a successful film
in hope that the idea will work as well a second time. Others will
then use the idea again and again until it stops working.3
Hollywood is supported by a small community that depends
on that most precious of commodities: the original idea. To create
entertainment, ideas must be developed until a finished, market-
able product can emerge from an initial concept. This development
occurs in a number of creative stages. The contributions of writers,
directors, editors, producers, and actors all shape the final work.
The unprotectable idea eventually develops into a fixed, copyright-
able expression.
Copyright, for example, would protect the finished expression
of a concept where a man named Joe (for the sake of argument
played by Kevin Costner) meets and falls in love with a woman
named Miriam (played by Sharon Stone) on a space station near
Mars in the near future. Joe, of course, says something insensitive
that hurts and alienates Miriam. As a result, Miriam begins a
relationship with Joe's evil step-brother Eddie (played by Tom
Cruise). Eddie, as it turns out, wants to sell Miriam into interga-
1. THE PLAYER (Fine Line Features 1992).
2. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217-18 (1954); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99,
102-03 (1879).
3. Sheila Johnston, Doubletake: What Happens When Too Many People Chase Too
Few Ideas? Two Robin Hoods, Two Dangerous Liaisons, THE INDEPENDENT (London),
July 19, 1991, at 17.
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lactic space slavery and kidnaps her. After a few slick spacecraft
fight sequences and nifty special effects, Miriam realizes that she
loves Joe. Joe eventually defeats Eddie in battle. The movie ends
with Joe and Miriam having a space wedding, and the credits roll.
Copyright protects many parts of this (albeit silly) example,
including the actual film prints, the scripts, and the set designs.
The tangible fixations of expression receive protection. Ideas
underlying the film, however, cannot be copyrighted.' For
example, the generic underlying idea of boy meets girl, boy loses
girl, boy eventually wins girl back will not be protected. After all,
"Ideas are free as air."5 Copyright does not extend to protecting
simple ideas such as boy meets girl.
Between the two extremes of a simple, unprotectable idea and
a fully copyrightable expression, a film project goes through many
stages where creative decisions are made that may not receive
copyright protection. Unless the author tangibly expresses creative
decisions, they cannot be copyrighted. Furthermore, ideas are not
eligible for independent protection. Therefore, a gap in intellectual
property law prevents an artist's creative endeavors from being
fully protected. If, for instance, an author creates a synopsis of a
proposed plot, copyright will protect the expression in the
synopsis. The specific ideas underlying the summation cannot be
copyrighted, and thus remain subject to theft.
An unethical writer or studio executive may steal the idea and
make sufficient alterations to avoid copyright problems, thereby
leaving the original writer without legal recourse. This practice of
idea theft has given rise to an intellectual property tort centering
around the "based upon" credit.6 The based upon credit tort
allows an author to sue to receive credit for an original idea used
in another work.
Courts recognized the importance of idea attribution in two
recent cases: Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures Corp.7 and King
4. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
5. Fendler v. Morosco, 171 N.E. 56, 58 (N.Y. 1930).
6. Cf. King v. Innovation Books, 976 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1992); Buchwald v.
Paramount Pictures Corp., 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1257 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
7. Buchwald, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1257.
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v. Innovation Books.8 These cases require either acknowledgement
of an idea contribution in a film,9 or the removal of a credit
where an author has not substantially contributed to a film, and the
use of the author's name in connection with the film would harm
the author.'0
Unfortunately, there is no consensus as to what exactly
"based upon" means regarding the protection of ideas. Neither the
legal community nor the creative community has developed a
standard meaning and test for the necessity of a based upon
credit."l In order to have legal significance, "based upon" needs
to have a clear and precise meaning, or it will be ineffective in
protecting the author from idea infringement.
This Note proposes the creation of a single legal standard for
a based upon attribution called the "concept initiator" credit.
8. King, 976 F.2d 824.
9. See Buchwald, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1257.
10. See King, 976 F.2d 824.
11. Entertainment experts disagree about the definition of "based upon." Paramount
creative executive David Kirkpatrick testified in the Buchwald trial that "based upon"
has two aspects-access to the author's work and "that the antecedents were of a signifi-
cant story nature to claim a based upon credit." Buchwald, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at
1262. According to Kirkpatrick, a movie is based upon another work if it "was created
out of significant elements from the underlying materials." Id. Kirkpatrick gave
comparable characters, story similarities, and like plot structures as examples of
"significant elements." Id. One Paramount attorney, Helene Hahn, testified that it meant
that a movie "had been derived from and incorporated the elements of author's work,"
while another, Alexandra Denman, said Coming to America was based upon Buchwald's
story if it were written "with the elements of Mr. Buchwald's story, I mean the specific
elements of the story, which is the work." Id. According to writer David Rintels, "based
upon" includes "intent" and a "similarity in spirit" that can be recognized from
experience. Id. Although writer Edmond H. North said that similarity in plot, theme, and
characters would be important to the determination, id., writer Lynn Roth would not
consider plot, characters, or motivation, id. at 1263. These, she said, relate to
"development of the project" rather than the basic theme. Id. According to Roth, "based
upon" means "something came from something else." Id. at 1262.
The King court summarized the testimony of John Breglio, an attorney specializing
in entertainment law:
[T]he industry standard for determining the meaning of a "based upon" movie
credit is very similar to that used by copyright lawyers in examining issues of
copyright infringement. Breglio further explained that this standard involved
looking "at the work as a whole and how much protected material from the
underlying work appears in the derivative work."
King, 976 F.2d at 829 (emphasis in original).
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Unlike copyright law, which protects only fixed expressions, the
concept initiator credit would protect certain ideas.
This Note defines a three-part test for courts to use when
deciding whether a concept initiator credit is needed in an
entertainment product. First, the idea is eligible for the concept
initiator credit if it qualifies as a "narrative crux." A narrative crux
is an idea that is so original and highly specific that the idea's
expression would receive copyright protection without being
invalidated by the merger doctrine. In a narrative crux, the idea
underlying the expression does not extend beyond the expression
itself. Second, the idea must be used qualitatively and quantitative-
ly in a second work. Finally, the concept initiator credit will not
be required unless the idea was knowingly used in another work.
To avoid confusion, this Note uses the term "concept
initiator" instead of the phrase "based upon" in order to differenti-
ate the new standard, which deals exclusively with ideas, from
copyright law, which concerns already fixed expressions. This
Note uses the "based upon" phrasing when discussing previous
case law because the courts have used the "based upon" language.
Part I examines the existing groundwork for the creation of
a single concept initiator standard, bearing in mind that existing
copyright law has already been expanded to protect some ideas
that are fixed in expressions. Since courts have ruled that
copyright and based upon actions are similar enough to justify a
common test,"2 copyright is relevant to explain the creation of the
concept initiator standard. Part II defines the concept initiator test.
Part Ill analyzes the effect of such a credit on the legal and artistic
communities. Although Hollywood has already been called
"lawsuit happy,"" this new credit will not significantly increase
litigation. If the standard is drawn narrowly, it should further
protect the creative community without causing a new flood of
lawsuits. Finally, this Note concludes that the concept initiator
credit will protect against idea theft.
12. See King, 976 F.2d at 829.
13. Joy Horowitz, Hollywood Law: Whose Idea Is It, Anyway?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
15, 1992, § 2, at 1.
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I. CREATION OF THE CONCEPT INITIATOR STANDARD
The concept initiator standard is a legally cognizable
extension of existing copyright and contract law. Although the
individual original ideas or concepts are not copyrightable, 14
copyright law provides the most closely analogous system for
protecting an author's creative work.
A. Recent Case Law Supporting the Creation of an Independent
Concept Initiator Credit Standard
Two recent cases, Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures Corp.15
and King v. Innovation Books, 6 lay a foundation for a concept
initiator credit.
Buchwald dealt with an eight-page screen treatment entitled
"It's a Crude, Crude World" by the famous humorist Art Buch-
wald, and the movie Coming to America.'7 In early 1982 Art
Buchwald prepared "It's a Crude, Crude World," concerning a
third-world prince who came to America for "a state visit."' 8 The
screen treatment described the story line in some detail,' 9 and
Buchwald gave a condensed, two-page treatment of the plot to
Paramount Pictures. Paramount subsequently entered into a
contract with Buchwald whereby Paramount bought the rights to
Buchwald's story and concept.20 Paramount wanted to base a
movie, starring Eddie Murphy, on Buchwald's story, to be called
"King for a Day."2' Another person would write the actual script,
but "King for a Day" was to be based on "It's a Crude, Crude
World. 22
The production team found hiring both a director and a writer
for the "King for a Day" project problematic, but Paramount
14. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217-18 (1954).
15. Buchwald, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1257.
16. King, 976 F.2d 824.
17. Buchwald, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1257.
18. Id. at 1264.
19. Id. at 1264-65.





finally assembled a creative team.23 No one, however, created a
satisfactory script, and Paramount officially abandoned the project
in March 1985.24 In May 1986, Buchwald optioned "It's a Crude,
Crude World" to the Warner Brothers Studio.
25
In the summer of 1987, Paramount began development of a
similar script by Eddie Murphy. In this movie (eventually called
Coming to America), Murphy would play an African prince who
comes to America to find a bride. The development of Coming to
America caused Warner Brothers to cancel further development of
Buchwald's story. Buchwald subsequently filed suit against
Paramount.
26
The court viewed this case as a breach of contract claim.2
Under contract, Buchwald transferred all rights to his original
story concepts to Paramount in return for payment for any future
motion picture produced from Buchwald's ideas.28 The breach of
contract claim turned on whether Coming to America was based
upon Buchwald's story treatment. The court found that "based
upon" had no standard definition in the entertainment industry,
even though many experts testified as to their understanding of the
term.29 Therefore, the court applied an analysis similar to that
used in copyright to find a standard for a based upon credit,
although the court admitted that Buchwald was not an infringe-
ment case and that copyright had no real application to ideas.3"
23. The film production team went through at least two writers and two directors
before work even began on the project. For a fully detailed description of the
troublesome search for creative talent to work on "King for a Day," see the factual
synopsis in Buchwald, id. at 1257-61.
24. Id. at 1260.
25. Id. at 1261.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1262.
29. Id. at 1262-63; see also supra note 11.
30. The court here quoted Nimmer on Copyright:
"However, the copyright requirements that similarity between plaintiffs
and defendant's work be 'substantial'.. . is not applicable in idea cases. If
the only similarity is as to an idea then by definition such similarity is not
substantial in the copyright sense. ... If there is a contractual or other
obligation to pay for an idea, the defendant cannot avoid such liability by
reason of the fact he did not copy more than the abstract or basis idea of
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The court based its analysis on past California cases that used a
copyright-like approach to breach of contract cases involving idea
theft.31
The court noted that the property conferred in the Paramount
contract was Buchwald's idea.32 The court applied a two-pronged
test to determine whether Paramount used Buchwald's idea.33
This two-part inquiry used the copyright tests of access and
substantial similarity to determine the need for a based upon
credit.34 The court stated that access would be determined by the
adapter's knowledge of the original author's ideas.35 It was
undisputed that Paramount creative executives discussed Buch-
wald's idea with Eddie Murphy and his manager.36 Because it
found there was "no real issue concerning access,"37 the court
went on to compare Buchwald's story and Coming to America.38
The court stated that an idea may change from its initial
adaptation to its expression in the final work. The court, however,
found enough similarities to establish an infringement of Buch-
wald's idea and, thus, a breach of contract by Paramount.39
The second case that helps set the framework for a concept
initiator standard involves an author who sued under "false light"
and "right to publicity" theories in order to remove a based upon
credit from a movie supposedly adapted from one of his short
stories.4" In King v. Innovation Books, author Stephen King sold
the movie rights for his short story "The Lawnmower Man" to
plaintiff's work"
Buchwald, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1263-64 (Buchwald's emphasis) (citations
omitted) (quoting 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 16.08[B] at 16-64
to 16-65 n.58).
31. Id. at 1264 (citing Fink v. Goodson-Todman Enters., 88 Cal. Rptr. 679 (Ct. App.
1970); Minniear v. Tors, 72 Cal. Rptr. 287 (Ct. App. 1968)), 1267 (citing Blaustein v.
Burton, 88 Cal. Rptr. 319 (Ct. App. 1970)).
32. See id. at 1267.





38. Id. at 1264.
39. Id. at 1268.
40. King v. Innovation Books, 976 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1992).
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The Great Fantastic Picture Corporation.41 The Great Fantastic
Picture Corporation then assigned the movie rights to "The
Lawnmower Man" to various entities, with New Line Films
eventually having the film's American distribution rights. 42 The
movie differed significantly from the short story.43 The title of
the film, however, was Stephen King's The Lawnmower Man, and
the credits included the acknowledgement "based upon a short
41. Id. at 826.
42. Id. at 827.
43. The court describes the short story:
The Short Story... involves Harold Parkette, a homeowner in the suburbs.
Parkette begins to neglect his lawn after an incident in which the boy who
usually mows his lawn mows over a cat. By the time Parkette focuses his
attention again on his overgrown lawn, the boy has gone away to college.
Parkette therefore hires a new man to mow his lawn. The lawnmower man
turns out to be a cleft-footed, obese and vile agent of the pagan god Pan. The
lawnmower man also is able to move the lawnmower psychokinetically-that
is, by sheer force of mind.
After starting the lawnmower, the lawnmower man removes his clothing
and crawls after the running mower on his hands and knees, eating both grass
and a mole that the mower has run over. Parkette, who is watching in horror,
phones the police. Using his psychokinetic powers, however, the lawnmower
man directs the lawnmower after Parkette, who is chopped up by the
lawnmower's blades after being chased through his house. The Short Story
ends with the discovery by the police of Parkette's entrails in the birdbath
behind the home.
Id. at 826.
The court then describes the movie:
The protagonist of the two hour movie is Dr. Lawrence Angelo. Experimenting
with chimpanzees, Dr. Angelo develops a technology, based on computer
simulation, known as "Virtual Reality," which allows a chimp to enter a three-
dimensional computer environment simulating various action scenarios. Dr.
Angelo hopes to adapt the technology for human use, with the ultimate goal
of accelerating and improving human intelligence.
Eventually, Dr. Angelo begins experimenting with his technology on Jobe,
who mows lawns in Dr. Angelo's neighborhood and is referred to as "the
lawnmower man." Jobe, a normal-looking young man, is simple and possesses
a childlike mentality. Dr. Angelo is able greatly to increase Jobe's intellect
with Virtual Reality technology. However, the experiment spins out of control,
with Jobe becoming hostile and violent as his intelligence and mental abilities
become super-human. In the build-up to the movie's climax, Jobe employs his
newly acquired psychokinetic powers to chase Dr. Angelo's neighbor (a man
named Harold Parkette) through his house with a running lawnmower, and to
kill him. The police discover the dead man's remains in the birdbath behind
his home, and, in the climax of the movie, Dr. Angelo destroys Jobe.
Id. at 827.
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story by Stephen King."' King sued to have his name removed
from the film.4
5
As in Buchwald, the King court found it difficult to determine
what exactly "based upon" meant4 6 and also confronted the
problem of how to test the propriety of a based upon credit. This
federal court, like the California court in Buchwald, decided to use
a standard similar to copyright infringement to determine the
suitability of a based upon credit in the film. 47 The court decided
that if the film drew "in material respects from a literary work,
both quantitatively and qualitatively, a 'based upon' credit should
not be viewed as misleading. 48
The court concluded that material resemblances existed
between the film and King's short story.49 The court, therefore,
held that a based upon credit was appropriate.5"
If an author has a contract with a film studio, some courts
have provided a right of attribution (or lack thereof) for the
author's ideas used in a film. Buchwald and King, however,
indicate that ideas (created under contract or not) can be explicit
enough to warrant protection. By applying elements of copyright
and contract law to idea misappropriation, courts have developed
the basis for creation of a concept initiator credit.
44. Id. at 826.
45. Id. at 828.
46. See id. at 829-30.
47. Id. at 829-30.
48. Id. at 830.
49. The court stated:
As King himself described it, "the core of my story, such as it is, is in the
movie ....
We recognize that several important and entertaining aspects of the Short
Story were not used in the film, and that conversely the film contains a
number of elements not to be found in the Short Story. However, when the
resemblances between the Short Story and the motion picture at issue here are
considered together, they establish to our satisfaction that the movie draws in
sufficiently material respects on the Short Story in both qualitative and
quantitative aspects.
50. Id. at 830-31.
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B. Elements of Existing Copyright Case Law Support the
Concept Initiator Standard
The Copyrights Act of 1976 explicitly protects only fixed
expression.5 The courts, however, have historically recognized
that certain elements outside the specific expression were pro-
tectable.5 2 In Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp.,53 Judge
Learned Hand stated that an expression's copyrightable elements
extended beyond speech to gestures, scenery, costumes, and even
the actor's appearance 4.5 Examples of such elements from other
cases include "total concept and feel" of a work,55 and character
56protection.
1. Copyright Protection of Ideas Underlying Expression
Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDon-
ald's Corp. illustrates the movement of copyright law to protect
concepts underlying expression. Krofft presented a two-part test
for determining similarity between a copyrighted work and an
allegedly infringing work. The test component compared identifi-
able factors such as plot, setting, artwork, and material used in the
expression. The court called this an extrinsic test.58 The second,
or intrinsic, test compared whether an ordinary reasonable person
51. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
52. See, e.g., Sid & Marty Krofft TV Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
1157 (9th Cir. 1977); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936); see also Edward Samuels, The Idea-Expression
Dichotomy in Copyright Law, 56 TENN. L. REv. 321, 353 (1989) (recognizing that the
Krofft decision borders on allowing the infringement of ideas alone to constitute a case
for copyright infringement).
53. Sheldon, 81 F.2d 49.
54. Id. at 55.
55. See Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1167.
56. See Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978); Detective
Comics, Inc. v. Bruns Publications, Inc., 11 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1940); King Features v.
Fleischer, 299 F.2d 533 (2d Cir. 1924); Hill v. Whalen & Martell, 220 F. 359 (S.D.N.Y.
1914).
57. See Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1167.
58. Id. at 1164.
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would believe that a substantial similarity exists between the two
works.5 9
Applying the test, the court held that McDonald's "McDon-
aldland" commercials infringed Krofft's H.R. Pufnstuf television
show because McDonaldland "captured the 'total concept and feel'
of the Pufnstuf show. '6' Both the imaginary land in Pufnstuf and
McDonaldland had caves, ponds, roads, castles, and human faces
on inanimate objects.6 The court said that these similarities went
beyond idea similarity and into expression infringement. 62
Despite the court's claim that it was only shielding expres-
sion,63 a closer analysis shows that the court in Krofft was
actually protecting ideas. 4 A land with roads, ponds, castles, and
talking trees hardly seems to be expression-specific.65 The court
essentially admits that it is protecting ideas by saying that
McDonaldland captured the "total concept" of the land in
Pufnstuf.66
2. Copyright Protection for Character Ideas
Ideas for characters also currently receive protection. In its
discussion of the extrinsic test, the court in Shaw v. Lindheim
67
used similar plots, characters, and general theme traits as evidence
to show that one television show infringed upon another show.68
The court used abstract traits such as the main character being
well-educated, wealthy, self-assured, and faithful as an example of
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1167 (quoting Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106,
1110 (9th Cir. 1970)).
61. Id. n.9.
62. Id. at 1167.
63. Id.
64. See Samuels, supra note 52, at 353.
65. Id.
66. See Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1167.
67. Shaw, 919 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1990).
68. Id. at 1357-58 (comparing a series pilot with the show The Equalizer, which
allegedly infringed upon the pilot).
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similar attributes, 9 although such themes are not expression-
specific and should not be copyrightable.70
The court in Shaw stated further that satisfaction of the
extrinsic test (comparing among other things, plot and settings)
alone created a triable issue of fact for copyright infiingement.71
The court admitted that "a man who will equalize the odds, a lone
man working outside the system" is an idea and unprotectable by
copyright.7" Nevertheless, when general traits such as wealth and
education are added to the idea of a lone equalizer, the court
stated that the idea becomes an expression.73 An educated, rich,
cocky, faithful man who works outside the law for the forces of
good, however, does not describe an expression-specific character.
Shaw is only one example in a long line of federal cases
offering copyright protection to ideas for characters. In 1954, in
Warner Bros. Pictures v. CBS, Inc.,74 the Ninth Circuit implied
that characters who constituted the basis of a story could be
copyrighted separately from the expression that contains the
character.75 Conversely, incidental characters, "chessm[e]n in the
game of telling the story,"76 cannot receive independent copy-
rights.77 The court, however, stated that the characters of an
author's imagination are bound to fall into a "limited pattern. 78
Therefore, by protecting the character, the court actually protects
69. Id. at 1358.
70. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
71. See Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1357.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1358.
74. Warner Bros. Pictures, 216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954).
75. See id. at 950.
76. See id.
77. Id.
78. Id. The court then quotes Holmes:
"He must be a poor creature that does not often repeat himself.... Why,
the truths a man carries about with him are his tools; and do you think a
carpenter is bound to use the same plane but once to smooth a knotty board
with, or to hang up his hammer after it has driven its first nail? I shall never
repeat a conversation, but an idea, often."
Id. n.5 (quoting O.W. HOLMES, THE AUTOCRAT OF THE BREAKFAST TABLE 9 (reprint
of the original edition)).
Number 2]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LA W JOURNAL
the idea underlying the character, which can be used in more than
one work by different authors.
In 1983 the court in Warner Bros. v. ABC 9 continued to
afford copyright protection without regard to any specific
expression. The court went so far as to say that the fact that a
character
may be an idea does not diminish the expressive aspect of the
combination [of particular traits]. But just as similarity cannot be
rejected by isolating as an idea each characteristic the characters
have in common, it cannot be found when the total perception of all
the ideas as expressed in each character is fundamentally differ-
ent.80
Thus an amalgamation of ideas can acquire copyright protection
regardless of the surrounding expression."'
Characters are therefore taking on copyrightable lives of their
own and are no longer bound to a singular expression. A fictional
character can be an idea or a general concept." As long as the
court can recognize a personality trait, or a character type, the
court can find copyright and infiingement.
C. The Coexistence of the Concept Initiator Credit and
Copyright Principles
Not only does current copyright law support the concept
initiator credit, the proposed credit also does not contradict
79. Warner Bros., 720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1983).
80. Id. at 243.
81. Id. at 242.
82. Michael Todd Helfand, Note, When Mickey Mouse Is as Strong as Superman:
The Convergence of Intellectual Property Laws to Protect Fictional Literary and
Pictorial Characters, 44 STAN. L. REV. 623, 624 (1992) (citing Leon Kellman, The
Legal Protection of Fictional Characters, 25 BROOK. L. REv. 6 (1958)).
83. Id. at 631.
Fully realized characters in literature are little different from fully defined
personalities in daily life, and it is no surprise that the test of protectibility that
courts apply [or should be applying] to literary characters is closely akin to the
criterion that individuals apply in daily life to determine whether they in truth
know someone. A literary character can be said to have a distinctive
personality, and thus to be protectible, when it has been delineated to the point
at which its behavior is relatively predictable so that, when placed in a new
plot situation, it will react in ways that are at once distinctive and unsurprising.
1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.7.2, at 128 (1989)
(citations omitted), quoted in Helfand, supra note 82, at 631 n.38.
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established copyright principles. For example, the merger doctrine,
which keeps a work from being copyrighted if the expression and
the larger idea underlying the expression are inseparable, is not at
odds with the proposed standard.84 The narrow definition of the
concept initiator credit's narrative crux85 ensures that a more
general idea does not extend beyond the expression. It is not
similar to the boy meets girl theme, which can be expressed in an
infinite number of ways. 6 The idea expressed in a plot synopsis,
like the Joe and Miriam story, extends only as far as the expres-
sion that evolves from the idea. In the same way, the concept
initiator credit covers only the original material elements underly-
ing one finished product.
Moreover, the concept initiator credit is analogous to the
derivative works doctrine. Creators of copyrighted works can grant
to other authors the right to create derivative works from the
original expression.87 Derivative works do not directly apply to
84. In the merger context, protecting the expression would also confer a monopoly
on the underlying idea. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879); Herbert Rosenthal
Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpadan, 446 F.2d 738, 741 (9th Cir. 1971); Morrissey v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir. 1967); Crume v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
140 F.2d 182, 184 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 755 (1944); see also Continental
Casualty Co. v. Beardsley, 253 F.2d 702, 705-06 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
816 (1958). The theory behind the merger doctrine holds that if the expression cannot
be copyrighted without also copyrighting the idea underlying the expression, then
copyright will not attach. See Baker, 101 U.S. at 103. The merger doctrine exists to
prevent the protection of ideas when the idea is so intertwined with the expression that
the expression cannot be created without also using the particular idea. See, e.g., id.;
Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp., 446 F.2d at 742; Morrissey, 379 F.2d at 678-79;
Crume, 140 F.2d at 189. The merger doctrine keeps ideas in the public domain for the
use of all authors and artists. To do otherwise would risk idea monopolization and
severely limit the number of concepts that could be expressed without infringement.
Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 966-67 (1990).
85. See infra part II.
86. Cf. Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp., 446 F.2d at 740-42 (using idea-expression
dichotomy concept to declare jeweled bee pin an idea not capable of receiving copyright
protection).
87. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 226-27 (1990). The Copyrights Act of 1976
grants to copyright owners the right to create derivative works. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2)
(1988). The derivative author, however, has only a copyright in the new things that he
or she adds to the underlying work. Durham Indus., Inc. v. Toomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905,
909 (2d Cir. 1980); L. Batlin & Son v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 857 (1976). The derivative work concept exists to strike a "balance between
the artist's right to control the work ... and the public's need for access to creative
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the concept initiator credit tort because the derivative work
doctrine only applies to copyrighted works. As with copyrightable
derivative works, concept initiator works take some preexisting
material and add to or change the underlying narrative crux.
"Concept initiator," like the derivative work doctrine, allows the
adapter to have access to the conceptualized idea while at the
same time allowing the creator of the idea to control, or at least
receive credit for, the underlying work.
Past and current case law shows that all of the necessary
elements for a concept initiator credit already exist. Unique and
exact ideas, which warrant protection when fixed in an expression,
should be treated as protectable property before they are fixed in
expression, regardless of whether the idea was created while under
contract.88
II. A PROPOSAL FOR THE CONCEPT INITIATOR
CREDIT STANDARD
The definition of "concept initiator" includes three inquiries:
first, whether the idea is a narrative crux; second, whether the
narrative crux was used quantitatively and qualitatively in a
second work; and third, whether the adapter knowingly used the
narrative crux. If all three inquiries are answered affirmatively, the
second work should include the concept initiator credit.
The first part of the concept initiator credit involves deciding
whether an idea is an independently created narrative crux. The
definition of narrative crux refers to well-defined ideas that, if
fixed in an expression, would be sufficiently original to warrant
copyright, without being invalidated by the merger doctrine. The
content of a narrative crux does not extend beyond the sole
expression of the idea itself. If the idea can be fixed in more than
one expression, the narrative crux criteria is not met. Under this
definition, a plot-line synopsis like the Joe and Miriam example
is a narrative crux. A general theme such as boy meets girl,
works." Stewart, 495 U.S. at 228.




however, does not meet the definition because it can be fixed in
more than one expression.
Part two of the definition looks to the quantitative and
qualitative use of the narrative crux in the creation of a second
work.89 As with copyright infringement, 90 exact copying is not
needed for concept initiator infingement to occur. The author of
the second work must only use the original idea "quantitatively
and qualitatively" in the adaptive expression.9
Fink v. Goodson-Todman Enterprises, Ltd.92 recognized that
similarities do not have to be as pronounced in a case that
involves adaption of an idea as they do in a case that compares
two fixed expressions.93 To determine whether or not a based
upon credit was needed, the Fink court used the same quantitative
and qualitative infringement test that is used to determine
copyright infringement.94 The court said that this test was
appropriate even when the similarity is quantitatively insignificant
in the second work.95 In applying the test, the court asked
whether there was a "structural spine" in the alleged adaptation's
work that had the same "structural dimensions" as the originator's
idea.96 The court ignored inconsequential modifications such as
changes in setting.97 In essence, this meant that a based upon
credit was appropriate despite the fact that a second work merely
used the original author's idea and not the original expression.98
89. Cf. King v. Innovation Books, 976 F.2d 824, 830 (2d Cir. 1992).
90. See Runge v. Lee, 441 F.2d 579, 582 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 887
(1971); Williams v. Kaag Mfrs., 338 F.2d 949, 951 (9th Cir. 1964); Universal Pictures
Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir. 1947).
91. Cf. Sid & Marty Krofft TV Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157
(9th Cir. 1977).
92. Fink, 88 Cal. Rptr. 679 (Ct. App. 1970).
93. Id. at 689.
94. Id. at 690-91.
95. Id. at 693.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 692.
98. See generally id. For instance, incidental points and scenes that result from a
common genre, like spaceships in a science fiction movie, do not qualify as appropriate
similarity comparisons because they are not essential to the author's idea. Olson v. NBC,
855 F.2d 1446, 1451 (9th Cir. 1988).
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Finally, under the definition of the concept initiator standard,
adaptive creators must be aware that they are using the original
author's narrative crux as the basis for the adaptation. This
requirement addresses the issue of access.99 Access in the
concept initiator context is proven by evidence such as a contract,
documentation, or striking similarity. To accommodate the new
standard, the traditional meaning of access must be broadened to
include situations such as overhearing a narrative crux and taking
the fully developed idea, or stealing the idea from a short synopsis
or screen treatment.
Unfortunately, this standard increases the possibility of
frivolous suits. Currently, copyright law uses a flexible standard
centered around a preponderance of the evidence to prove
infringement. 0 In order to discourage unmeritorious suits, yet
still protect against idea theft, the burden of proof should be raised
to a clear and convincing standard. Adoption of the clear and
convincing standard would help protect narrative cruxes, yet keep
general ideas in the public realm.
99. Access must be established to prove copyright infringement. Reyher v.
Children's TV Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 1976).
100. As the court in Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions v. McDonald's Corp.,
stated:
No amount of access will suffice to show copying if there are no
similarities. This is not to say, however, that where clear and convincing
evidence of access is presented, the quantum of proof required to show
substantial similarity may not be lower than when access is shown merely by
a preponderance of the evidence. As Professor Nimmer has observed: "[C]lear
and convincing evidence of access will not avoid the necessity of also proving
substantial similarity since access without similarity cannot create an inference
of copying. However, this so-called 'Inverse Ratio Rule' . .. would seem to
have some limited validity. That is, since a very high degree of similarity is
required in order to dispense with proof of access, it must logically follow that
where proof of access is offered, the required degree of similarity may be
somewhat less than would be necessary in the absence of such proof."
Krofft, 562 F.2d 1157, 1172 (9th Cir. 1977) (citations omitted) (quoting 2 MELVILLE B.
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 143.4, at 634 (1976)); see also Buchwald v.
Paramount Pictures Corp., 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1257, 1264 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)
("[P]laintiff has the burden of proving similarity by a preponderance of the evidence.").
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HI. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONCEPT INITIATOR
STANDARD
The concept initiator standard is needed not only in the area
of entertainment law, but in other areas of creative endeavor as
well. "Idea theft," says entertainment lawyer Pierce O'Donnell, "is
a cancer in Hollywood. In an industry where imagination and
creativity [are] the key[s] to success, idea theft is grand larceny.
And it is prevalent."''1 1
Beyond Buchwald, many of Hollywood's latest hits and even
major box office bombs have been the subjects of lawsuits for
idea theft. Recently, Martha Raye sued producers over the movie
For the Boys. Raye claimed the movie told her life story without
giving her credit. A Canadian filmmaker claimed that Die Hard is
"wholesale cinematic 'Xeroxing"' of his own movie entitled Kings
and Desperate Men. People also sued over the plot of Home
Alone. The storyline of a French movie, Pre Noel, in which a boy
left home alone on Christmas must defend his home from an
intruder, does sound familiar. The director of Pre Noel filed
suit.102
Idea theft occurs because of the current Hollywood business
structure. Writers freely pitch oral ideas, and the line between a
remake and a blatant infringement frequently blurs. 0 3 Another
root of the idea theft problem is the fact that Hollywood is such
a small community. In essence, everyone works with everybody
else."°4 Plagiarism is said to be systemic.
New writers must openly promote their ideas in hope of
landing their first contract. Unfortunately, studio executives may
turn around and give the idea to a top (A-list) writer to develop,
while the original writer receives nothing for his or her cre-
ation.0 5 The sometimes brazen attitude of the studio executives
101. Horowitz, supra note 13, at 1.
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has been described as the "we can get away with it, so let's do it"
mentality. 10 6
Studio executives sometimes even view idea theft as ethical.
"There are people in this town [Hollywood]--everybody knows
their names-who are wildly unethical in the way they do business,
but you can't ignore them because they have proven they can make
successful movies," says a producer who has worked both indepen-
dently and as studio executive. "There's the attitude at the studios
that if it's legal, it's ethical. Well, people are screwed legally in this
town every day."'O7
Many executives also have decided to let writers sue for a stolen
idea because the suit will be settled later for less money than
owed on the original contract.10 8 Frequently, an idea theft settle-
ment includes a confidentiality agreement so the public does not
know anything about the idea theft."0 9
The idea theft problem frequently becomes compounded by
the popular idea and sequel phenomena. It has been suggested that
there are only thirty-six different dramatic situations.1 Holly-
wood productions regularly deal with approximately seven of the
thirty-six situations.' Hollywood also experiences fads for the
same theme." 2 In past years, two productions of Robin Hood,
two productions of Dangerous Liaisons,"3 and two productions
of Christopher Columbus were being filmed simultaneously in a
race to be the first to reach the theaters." 4 These competing
productions can spawn idea theft suits." 5
The entertainment industry also thrives on the sequel
phenomenon. A sequel will usually earn money based upon the
popularity and audience familiarity with the characters and
106. Id. at 23.
107. Jack Mathews, How Blind Is Hollywood Ethics?, L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 22, 1990,
Calendar Section, at 8.
108. Id.
109. Horowitz, supra note 13, at 22.
110. G. POLTI, THE THIRTY SIX DRAMATIC SITUATIONS 3 (1968).
111. Johnston, supra note 3.
112. Id.
113. Id.





situations presented. Once a particular plot line or character proves
to be successful, others will copy it in an effort to capitalize on
the original product's popularity.116
The creation of a concept initiator standard would help
alleviate idea theft. Writers would benefit most directly. Currently,
the only protection a writer can obtain for a fully developed
original idea is to register the idea treatment with the Writer's
Guild of America. l i ' This precaution, however, frequently falls
short.1 8 Art Buchwald could successfully sue Paramount be-
cause his contract promised payment for any idea made into a
movie, not because he registered his work with the Writer's
Guild.119
The concept initiator credit would at least force credit to be
acknowledged where it is due. If fully conceptualized ideas can be
the subject of a contract, 2 ° they are sufficiently concrete and
legitimate to give rise to an independent idea theft suit. Currently,
if an idea not generated under contract gets stolen, others get the
credit, notoriety, and profits from an adaptation.
The studios would also benefit from the creation of a concept
initiator standard. The concept initiator credit would act as extra
insurance that a competing studio would not use the same concept
in a similar movie before copyright can attach. The studio would
thus be better able to protect the ideas generated by its pool of
writers.
Arguably, a potential problem with the creation of a concept
initiator credit would be an increase in the number of suits. When
the court decided Buchwald, many commentators felt it would
cause an increase in the number of lawsuits because of the public
perception of receiving easy money.121 This increase in suits,
however, would not result from the concept initiator standard.
116. Johnston, supra note 3.
117. Horowitz, supra note 13, at 23.
118. Id.
119. Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1257, 1261
(Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
120. See id.
121. Horowitz, supra note 13, at 22.
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The proposed test for the concept initiator credit includes a
safeguard to prevent an increase in suits. The use of current legal
requirements for similarity and access would in effect preclude
most concept initiator suits as the tests already do for copyright
infringement cases. Most copyright infringement suits are not valid
claims. The suits usually fail because they do not meet the basic
legal standards required to prove a legitimate cause of action for
infringement.' In fact, studios label most copyright suits as
nuisance suits.' "If you write a hit movie, the odds are good
you'll get sued," said Craig Jacobson, a Hollywood entertainment
lawyer. 24
Infringement accusations may be easy to make, but the claims
are difficult to prove and expensive to litigate. The cost and
difficulty of litigating deters most people from suing."5 The
proposed concept initiator credit requirement retains these same
expense and difficulty factors.
In addition, the creation of a concept initiator standard will
not cause further harm, such as bankrupting the entertainment
industry. The studios already protect themselves from idea theft
allegations through the use of insurance. Production companies
regularly buy errors and omissions (E&O) insurance. 6 Errors
and omissions insurance protects against all infringement liabili-
ties.1 27 Although E&O insurance, by itself, is not a reason to
adopt a concept initiator standard, it shows that the concept
initiator credit tort will not create insurmountable problems in the
entertainment field.
Ideas from the creative community need and deserve
protection from rampant idea theft. 2 8 A combination of lack of
effective writer protection, a closed community, and a premium
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1.
125. Id. at 22.
126. Lee Proimos, That's Entertainment; Excess and Surplus Lines, BEST'S REVIEW:
PROPERTY/CASUALTY INSURANCE EDITION, Aug. 1988, at 54, 56.
127. See Mathews, Voyage of Rediscovery, supra note 114.
128. Horowitz, supra note 13, at 1.
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placed on a few popular ideas and sequels creates an atmosphere
where unprotected ideas will continue to be taken without
protection.'29 Creating the concept initiator credit will at least
partially remedy the situation without causing a significant
increase in litigation or expense.
CONCLUSION
Buchwald and King lay a foundation to create a concept
initiator credit, but provide no uniform definition for the term
"based upon."'3 ° Using the Buchwald and King cases as a
springboard, the concept initiator credit cause of action can be
created. The action for a concept initiator credit starts with a
narrative crux, which is a highly developed, but not yet fixed, idea
whose fixed expression would received copyright protection. If an
adaptor knowingly uses a narrative crux quantitatively and
qualitatively to adapt it into another expression, a concept initiator
credit should appear.
The proposal for a mandatory concept initiator credit is not
a legal anomaly without any basis in current law. The concept
only slightly extends the similar existing copyright law, which has
begun to protect the idea in an expression. 3' Characters and
other features that transcend a single expression already receive
protection through copyright.' Federal courts already recognize
a based upon credit in other contexts as a legitimate claim, 3
and California has ample case law permitting suits for idea
misappropriation in a contract context. 3
129. See Johnston, supra note 3.
130. See supra note 11.
131. See Sid & Marty Krofft TV Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157
(9th Cir. 1977).
132. See Warner Bros. v. ABC, 720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1983); Warner Bros. Pictures,
Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954).
133. See King v. Innovation Books, 976 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1992).
134. See, e.g., Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures, Corp., 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1257
(Cal. Ct. App. 1990); Mann v. Columbia Pictures, Inc., 180 Cal. Rptr. 522 (Ct. App.
1982); Fink v. Goodson-Todman Enters., 88 Cal. Rptr. 679 (Ct. App. 1970); Blaustein
v. Burton, 88 Cal. Rptr. 319 (Ct. App. 1970); Minniear v. Tors, 72 Cal. Rptr. 287 (Ct.
App. 1968).
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The creative community needs a concept initiator credit to
protect against idea theft. This proposal provides a practical
solution for a continuing problem in intellectual property law
without contradicting established copyright doctrine.
It is time to create a uniform concept initiator credit standard
to protect the author of a fully conceptualized, original, discrete
idea that only needs fixation to complete its development. This
small step will greatly help the entertainment, creative, and artistic
communities. Authors should receive credit for their own unique
ideas, but they often do not. Art Buchwald best summed up the
idea theft problem for the unattributed writer after he saw Coming
to America. He said, "It was an awful movie, but it was my awful
movie."115
135. Douglas Kari, Buchwald v. Paramount: Minding Hollywood's Business, ENT. L.
REP., May 1991; see also Mark Christensen, Coming to Los Angeles, CAL. MAG., Feb.
1991, at 36; Dennis McDougal, Playing in Court, an Inside Look at an Eddie Murphy
Movie Deal, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1989, at B1.
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